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During the takeover wave of the 1980s, managers developed nu-
merous strategies to fend off unwanted bidders and retain control of
their firms. These strategies included the poison pill, often used in com-
bination with the effective classified board. Corporate scholars expressed
concern over the serious conflict of interest inherent in managerial con-
trol over takeovers, arising from the fact that takeovers often presage
managerial termination. Many corporate scholars argued that the poison
pill should be prohibited.' Many also concluded that managers should be
required to submit bids to shareholders.
Responding to the fundamental conflict attending board-enacted
takeover defenses, the Delaware Supreme Court initially provided for
heightened scrutiny of takeover defenses adopted by the board . In Uno-
cal v Mesa Petroleum the Delaware Supreme Court announced a two-
tiered proportionality review of takeover defenses.The first prong entails
an assessment of whether the board was responding to a legitimate
threat to corporate policy and effectiveness. The second prong asks the
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1 See Marcel Kahan and Edward B. Rock, How IStopped Worrying and Learned to Love the
PilL'Adaptive Responses to Takeover Law, 69 U Chi L Rev 871, 876 n 16 (2002) (discussing opposi-
tion to the poison pill).
2 See, for example, LucianA. Bebchuk, Comment, The Case forFacilitating Competing Tender
Offers, 95 Harv L Rev 1028,1034-38 (1982) (arguing for an auctioneering rule that requires manag-
ers to solicit competing bids and then submit them to shareholders); Ronald J. Gilson,A Structural
Approach to Corporations: The Case Against Defensive Tactics in Tender Offers, 33 Stan L Rev 819,
844-48 (1981) (stating that shareholders' unrestricted access to tender offerors is necessary to impose
constraints on managers).
3 Unocal Corp v Mesa Petroleum Co,493 A2d 946,954 (Del 1985) ("Because of the omnipres-
ent specter that a board [when addressing a pending takeover bid] may be acting primarily in its own
interests, rather than those of the corporation and its shareholders, there is an enhanced duty which
calls for judicial examination at the threshold before the protections of the business judgment rule
may be conferred.").
4 493 A2d 946 (Del 1985).
5 Id at 955 ("[D]irectors must show that they had reasonable grounds for believing that a dan-
ger to corporate policy and effectiveness existed because of another person's stock ownership.").
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court to determine whether the defensive measure was proportionate to
the threat posed.
The Unocal standard initially appeared to offer the promise of court
review of both the purposes for and structure of takeover defenses.' It
thus appeared to place some effective limitations on the board. This
promise largely evaporated with the Delaware Supreme Court's deci-
sions in Unitrin, Inc v American General Corp8 and Paramount Commu-
nications, Inc v Time-Warner, Inc.9 In these decisions, the Delaware Court
effectively removed the teeth from both prongs of the Unocal standard.
The court concluded that the board could defend against a noncoercive
all-cash, all-shares offer if it determined that the price was too low.
Moreover, the court permitted the board to employ any defensive meas-
ure it preferred provided the measure was not "preclusive or coercive." 0
Finally, the court also concluded that the board could "just say no" to an
acquisition."
Many commentators decried this development in Delaware law.
They argued that "just say no" would reduce shareholder welfare by giv-
ing the board control over takeovers, a central mechanism for disciplin-
ing the board. Leading corporate scholars asserted that shareholder wel-
fare would be maximized by giving shareholders ultimate control over
tender offer defenses, thereby wresting from the board managerial au-
thority over this area.12
6 Id ("If a defensive measure is to come within the ambit of the business judgment rule it must
be reasonable in relation to the threat posed.").
7 The potential for court supervision of takeover defenses was undercut by the Delaware
Court's decision to grant business judgment rule-like review to the board's assessment of the threat
posed. Id at 954. As a result, the court would credit an informed board's statement that a takeover
bid was too low, and a responsive measure (such as a self-tender) was at a fair price, even if this claim
by the board did not entirely seem credible. See id at 958-59 (concluding that a discriminatory
"scorched earth" self-tender was a proportionate response because the informed board concluded
that the self-tender at a substantial premium offered a fair price for the shares).
8 651 A2d 1361 (Del 1995).
9 571 A2d 1140 (Del 1989).
10 See Unitrin, 651 A2d at 1388 (noting that "if the board of directors' defensive response is not
draconian (preclusive or coercive) and is within a'range of reasonableness,' a court must not substi-
tute its judgment for the board's").
11 Time-Warner,571 A2d at 1154-55 (holding that"[d]irectors are not obliged to abandon a de-
liberately conceived corporate plan for a short-term shareholder profit unless there is clearly no ba-
sis to sustain the corporate strategy").
12 See, for example, Bebchuk, Comment, 95 Harv L Rev at 1054 (cited in note 2) (arguing that
managers cannot be trusted with the power to use obstructionist tactics to block bids); Frank H.
Easterbrook and Daniel R.Fischel, The Proper Role of Target's Management in Responding to a Ten-
der Offer, 94 Harv L Rev 1161,1194-1204 (1981) (claiming that rules allowing management to en-
gage in defensive tactics in response to a tender offer decrease shareholders' welfare); Gilson, 33
Stan L Rev at 865 (cited in note 2). While most agree that shareholders should be given the choice,
they differ on whether shareholders should evaluate bids individually or collectively, by requiring a
majority vote on any tender offer. Compare Lucian Arye Bebchuk, Toward Undistorted Choice and
Equal Treatment in Corporate Takeovers, 98 Harv L Rev 1693,1702-06 (1985) (shareholder vote is
preferable), and Lucian Bebchuk and Oliver Hart, Takeover Bids vs. Proxy Fights in Contests for
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In their contribution to this Symposium, Marcel Kahan and Ed
Rock argue that critics of Delaware law may have overstated both the
adverse effects of the change in Delaware law and the need for reform.
Many proposals for legal intervention presume an essential role for law,
largely because they implicitly assume that corporate constituents-
shareholders and managers-do not themselves act to redress the prob-
lem of board agency costs in adopting takeover defenses. By contrast,
Kahan and Rock claim, corporate constituents can, and do, act to reduce
agency costs by employing "adaptive devices." This widespread use of
private solutions to board agency costs suggests that the development of
the poison pill and adoption of "just say no" have not necessarily had a
decisive negative impact on corporate welfare, Kahan and Rock assert.'3
This warrants reexamination of the conventional wisdom regarding the
need to change Delaware law governing takeovers, they conclude.
Kahan and Rock's recognition of the availability of private solutions
to the problem of the board's conflict of interest in responding to tender
offers is important, especially since private parties have a range of in-
struments available to them that are not available to the courts." Never-
theless the possibility of private action does not necessarily lead to the
conclusions they reach regarding the significance-or relative lack
thereof-of Delaware law governing takeovers. Notwithstanding the
possibility of private action, Delaware law may play a vital role because
private parties cannot necessarily remedy all agency cost problems asso-
ciated with tender offers, and courts have instruments available to them
that are not available to the parties. Appropriate legal intervention thus
may extend beyond adopting optimal default rules parties might adopt
to include interventions designed to redress problems the parties cannot
solve themselves. Thus optimal legal regimes may operate in concert with
private "contracting" by altering the set of feasible private solutions. A
suboptimal legal regime can result in suboptimal private agreements.
Thus, legal intervention may matter a great deal even when parties can
adopt mechanisms to govern a particular issue. An optimal legal regime
can enable the parties to adopt arrangements that they otherwise could
not (or would not), increasing the parties' joint welfare."
Corporate Control at 22-34, Harvard John M. Olin Discussion Paper No 336 (Oct 2001), available
online at <http'/lwwv.law.harvard.edu/programs/olin-center/> (visited Feb 19,2002) (same), with
Ronald I Gilson and Alan Schwartz, Sales and Elections as Methodsfor Transferring Corporate Con-
trol,2Theor Inq in L783,790-92 (2001) (straight tender offer is preferable to requiring shareholder
voting on tender offers).
13 Kahan and Rock, 69 U Chi L Rev at 911 (cited in note 1) (concluding that "the pill contrib-
uted to a new equilibrium in which it seems to have been transformed into a device that plausibly is
in shareholders' interests").
14 Id at 900-01 (arguing that the takeover experience demonstrates how the possibility of pri-
vate strategic action makes it very difficult to predict the effects of legal development).
15 I am using the term "contracts" to refer to arrangements included in the voluntary agree-
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Legal intervention may be particularly important with respect to
tender offer defenses because private contracting in this area is adversely
affected by many problems, some of which may best be addressed by le-
gal intervention. One important problem, considered here, is that of un-
foreseen contingencies. This limitation is aggravated by the problem of
unverifiability. Corporate constituents' ability to employ private solu-
tions to address the takeover defense problem is limited by the fact that
they cannot easily contract to prohibit, or limit the scope of, antitakeover
devices. Corporate constituents cannot write contracts that prohibit "an-
titakeover devices," for example, because it often is difficult to define the
term: it is often hard to determine whether a corporate action is an anti-
takeover device or a legitimate business action. This is particularly true
of antitakeover devices employed in advance of a tender offer. Nor can
corporate constituents circumvent this problem by identifying and indi-
vidually prohibiting each potential antitakeover device because they
cannot fully anticipate all the measures a board might employ. These
other measures might be worse for the firm than the prohibited meas-
ures. Thus, absent legal intervention, shareholders who otherwise might
wish to limit defensive measures may nevertheless prefer not to restrict
the board's power to employ well-known measures, such as the poison
pill, for fear that the board will instead use even more destructive de-
vices. By contrast, under a legal regime entailing more careful court scru-
tiny of board responses to the takeover threat, shareholders might seek
to restrict takeover defenses. This regime might thus be welfare-
improving.
Accordingly, the conclusion that private parties can respond to the
Delaware Court's adoption of "just say no" does not imply that "just say
no" did not significantly reduce shareholder welfare. The doctrine leaves
shareholders vulnerable to unpredictable strategic board action, in ways
the parties cannot adequately redress through private arrangements.
Even with private solutions it remains to be considered whether Dela-
ware courts potentially could improve shareholder welfare by altering
Delawaie antitakeover law to limit the scope of antitakeover defenses.
Thus, while private agreements must be taken into account, they do not
necessarily replace the need for legal intervention in this area.
I. TAKEOVER DEFENSES AND AGENCY COSTS
To understand the strength of Kahan and Rock's views concerning
private solutions to takeover defenses, it is important to recognize that
shareholders could benefit from board control over takeovers if share-
ments that govern intrafirm relationships between shareholders and managers, whether or not these
are true legal contracts resulting from bilateral agreements. In other words, the term is used to en-
compass what Rock and Kahan refer to as "adaptive devices."
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holders could eliminate (or reduce) the problem of board agency costs.
Indeed, board control over takeover defenses might be optimal in a
world in which "complete contracting" between shareholders and man-
agers is possible.
Takeover defenses can benefit shareholders in a variety of ways,
were boards loyal agents of shareholders. For example, takeover de-
fenses benefit shareholders by enabling them to resist structurally coer-
cive offers, such as the front-loaded two-tiered tender offer involved in
UnocaL " In addition, takeover defenses may benefit shareholders faced
with a tender offer at an excessively low price. Shareholders face collec-
tive action problems when deciding how to respond to a takeover bid.
Unable to negotiate a higher price, shareholders may find it in their indi-
vidual interests to accept a low-price offer that it would be in their col-
lective interests to reject. Board control over takeover defenses poten-
tially can enable shareholders to redress this problem by enabling the
board, in effect, to bargain collectively on behalf of shareholders."
Board control also could benefit shareholders because the board is
likely to be better informed about the relative merits of an acquirer's of-
fer. The value of an offer to shareholders is not simply the price offered,
but rather is the expected value of the deal. This depends on both the
value of the consideration offered and the expected value of the target
should the deal fail subsequent to the offer being accepted. The possibil-
ity of noncompletion must be taken into account since a significant per-
centage of signed deals do indeed fail to go through and non-
consummation can depress the target's price below its pre-bid level.' 9
Failure of an accepted deal can reduce the target's value below its pre-
bid level in part because the target may undergo changes after the deal is
16 493 A2d 946 (Del 1985).
17 For a more detailed discussion of the collective action problem see Lucian Bebchuk, The
CaseAgainst Board Veto in Corporate Takeovers,69 U Chi L Rev 973,981 (2002) (noting that the col-
lective action problem here is a familiar one and "most visible and conspicuous in the case of partial,
two-tier bids"); Bebchuk and Hart, Takeover Bids v& Proxy Fights in Contests for Corporate Control
at 3 (cited in note 12) (analyzing the collective action problems associated with different mechanisms
for changing corporate control); Bebchuk, 98 Harv L Rev at 1719-35 (cited in note 12) (examining
the causes of and difficulties posed by distortion of shareholders' tender decisions).
18 As Ehud Kamar has noted, the expected value of an offer is a function of both the consid-
eration offered and the probability that a signed deal will go through. See Ehud Kamar, Managerial
Change-in-Control Benefits and Takeovers at 4, working paper (Jan 2002) (on file with author).The
expected gain to target shareholders from an acquisition, therefore, is given by:
{(prob deal completed) (bid price) + (prob deal not completed) (value target if deal fails)) -
pre-bid price of target
19 Even friendly deals face a significant risk of noncompletion.A study of negotiated mergers
between 1988-1999 found that 24 percent of these deals were not completed if there was no lock-up
or break-up fee and 5 percent were not completed even with both a lock-up and break-up fee. See
John C. Coates IV and Guhan Subramanian,A Buy-Side Model of M&A Lockups: Theory and Evi-
dence, 53 Stan L Rev 307,347 (2000).
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announced but before the deal is completed-including the loss of key
personnel. Managers are likely to have better information than share-
holders on both the probability and the potential cost of deal failure, giv-
ing them superior information on an important component of bid value.
This potentially gives the board an informational advantage in assessing
a bid even when the offer is all cash, the firm is actively followed by ana-
lysts, and institutional shareholders have significant holdings.
Although shareholders could benefit from leaving loyal managers in
charge of takeovers, in practice strong reasons exist for being concerned
about granting boards the power both to fend off tender offers and to
shape those deals that are accepted. Managers are concerned with their
own welfare, in particular the potential loss of their jobs following an ac-
quisition, and thus may attempt to defeat any bid not in their own per-
sonal interests. Indeed, managers are particularly likely to attempt to de-
feat a takeover when an acquisition is most beneficial to shareholders:
when the firm is underperforming as a result of poor management. Fi-
nally, managers may use takeover defenses to alter the structure of pay-
ments made in an acquisition-increasing the benefit to managers of the
acquisition at the expense of shareholders.20
Most law-and-economics scholars weighing the advantages of board
control over defensive measures against the costs have concluded that
board control over defensive measures is inefficient. Most law-and-
economics corporate scholars support proposals that restrict the board's
ability to veto takeovers in favor of leaving the matter up to sharehold-
ers.2' These scholars thus have decried the Delaware Supreme Court's
decision effectively to eviscerate Unocal's proportionality review and to
permit boards to "just say no" to hostile tender offers without submitting
bids to shareholders.
II. KAHAN AND ROCK ON MECHANISM DESIGN
A central limitation of existing analysis, Marcel Kahan and Ed Rock
argue, is that it implicitly assumes that the problem of board agency costs
when responding to takeovers requires legal intervention. This is not nec-
essarily the case, they observe.The parties themselves-shareholders and
20 Managerial side payments can take a variety of forms, from lucrative post-deal consulting
contracts to significant additional golden parachutes or executive stock options. See Kamar, Manage-
rial Change-in-Control Benefits and Takeovers at 4--6 (cited in note 18) (exploring the increase in
managers' conflicts of interest in evaluating acquisitions potentially created by executive stock op-
tions).
21 See, for example, Bebchuk, Comment, 95 Harv L Rev at 1054 (cited in note 2) (arguing for
an auctioneering rule that requires managers to solicit competing bids and then submit them to
shareholders); Easterbrook and ischel, 94 Harv L Rev at 1194-1204 (cited in note 12) (arguing that
management should be passive in the face of tender offers); Gilson, 33 Stan L Rev at 876 (cited in
note 2) (stating that "[s]hareholders must make tender offer decisions").
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and managers-also can implement mechanisms to govern takeover de-
fenses. Accordingly, Kahan and Rock argue, scholars considering legal in-
tervention to govern defensive measures must first take into account the
possibility of private action.2To the degree to which the parties can ame-
liorate the problem of board agency costs on their own, additional legal
intervention may not be necessary.
Kahan and Rock's central insight about the existence of private so-
lutions to the board's agency cost problems is an important contribution
to the literature on tender offer defenses. Existing analyses generally as-
sume that "shareholder choice" default rules are needed because con-
tracting costs impair the ability managers and shareholders to adopt op-
timal arrangements to govern tender offers. Yet, Kahan and Rock ob-
serve, private parties not only can, but do, adopt a variety of mechanisms
for dealing with the board's agency costs.2 These existing private solu-
tions must be considered even though shareholders and managers gener-
ally do not bargain over terms of the corporate contract in the traditional
24
sense.
Attention to private arrangements is particularly important because
shareholders and managers have a different range of solutions available
to them than do the courts. For example, the parties can affect the struc-
ture of managerial compensation packages, whereas the courts cannot.
This wider range of mechanisms presents the possibility that corporate
constituents can structure the board's incentives to limit the adverse con-
sequences of the board's conflict of interest while retaining the benefits
of the board's informational advantage regarding takeovers.Thus, Kahan
and Rock's analysis requires that those seeking legal intervention defend
22 Kahan and Rock, 69 U Chi L Rev at 900-01 (cited in note 1).
23 Id at 883-87.
24 The fact that these solutions are not adopted as part of a classic "contract" negotiation does
not undermine Kahan and Rock's claim that these provisions can be thought of as being contractual,
in the sense of being provisions both shareholders and managers prefer and, in effect, agree to.
Boards may respond to market forces that cause them to internalize shareholders' preferences in de-
signing corporate charter and bylaw provisions.This could lead corporate arrangements to mimic the
results of bilateral bargaining between managers and shareholders. For example, managers might be
induced to implement optimal terms prior to an initial public offering because they tend to be the re-
sidual claimants of an IPO and thus benefit from terms that shareholders value. This depends on
IPOs being priced efficiently, however. In addition, managers might subsequently be induced to
adopt charter provisions preferred by shareholders if. (i) institutional share ownership is sufficiently
great that managers fear a proxy contest; or (ii) if the company needs to return regularly to the eq-
uity markets for additional capital in circumstances where managers benefit from obtaining the low-
est cost of capital possible. Indeed, the cornerstone of corporate law scholarship-the nexus of con-
tracts-presumes that corporate law should focus on enabling statutes because parties can contract
around suboptimal provisions. It is rarely assumed that this would be contracting in the classic sense,
but rather that managers would respond to market forces in selecting charter and bylaw provisions.
25 Kahan and Rock, 69 U Chi L Rev at 888-89 (cited in note 1) (noting that private responses
offer greater flexibility and an opportunity for fine tuning).
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not only the merits of their proposals, but also explain why any proposed
legal intervention should supplant private efforts to solve the problem.
Corporate constituents' access to a rich array of private solutions to
the tender offer problem leads Kahan and Rock to conclude that Dela-
ware takeover defense law plays a less significant role than is generally
believed. Thus, scholars need not be particularly concerned about either
the Delaware Supreme Court's "just say no" doctrine or its effective
elimination of any serious proportionality review.2 Moreover, Kahan and
Rock cast doubt on whether "shareholder choice" is indeed the optimal
default rule by observing that existing "adaptive devices" generally do
not give shareholders power over tender offers. Kahan and Rock observe
that corporations generally have eschewed "shareholder choice" without
widespread objection from shareholders. For example, none of the three
hundred companies that went public between 1994 and 1997 limited the
board's ability to implement a poison pill or mandated shareholder
choice on takeoversY In fact, a majority of firms conducting initial public
offerings increased managers' power to fend off tender offers by classify-
ing the board and limiting shareholders' ability either to get a special
meeting or act through written consent. Similarly, in the case of existing
firms, institutional shareholders have not tried to prohibit poison pills,
nor have they rallied behind the shareholder choice proposals that many
scholars claim are in their interestsn This evidence of apparent share-
holder acceptance of board power over defensive measures potentially
casts doubt on assertions that "shareholder choice" maximizes share-
holder welfare.29
26 Id at 900-01.
27 Id at 885.
28 Id at 885-87.
29 The possibility that such rules are suboptimal is a potential concern for their proponents
even though these rules are proposed simply as default rules because suboptimal court-adopted de-
fault rules can reduce the parties' joint welfare. Adoption of a suboptimal but welfare-improving de-
fault rule can make the parties worse off than otherwise because introduction of the rule may result
in the parties failing to adopt optimal provisions they otherwise would have adopted.This may occur
where, absent legal intervention, the gain to the parties of redressing the problem exceeded the con-
tracting costs, but with the suboptimal default rule any remaining problems are no longer large
enough to warrant the expenditure needed to eliminate it entirely. For a discussio'n of the problems
of designing optimal default rules see, for example, Ian Ayres and Robert Gertner, Majoritarian vs%
Minoritarian Defaults,51 Stan L Rev 1591,1611 (1999) (identifying principles that should guide "effi-
ciency-minded lawmakers" in creating default rules); Ian Ayres and Robert Gertner, Strategic Con-
tractual Inefficiency and the Optimal Choice of Legal Rules, 101 Yale L J 729,762 (1992) (arguing that
when contracting around default rules is costly "the appropriate choice of default can depend on a
variety of underlying variables that are independent of the hypothetical contract that parties would
sign in a world without transaction costs"); Ian Ayres and Robert Gertner, Filling Gaps in Incomplete
Contracts:An Economic Theory of Default Rules, 99 Yale L J 87,127-28 (1989) (arguing for penalty
defaults when strategic bargaining may impede parties from bargaining around default rules). See
also Barry E. Adler, The Questionable Ascent of Hadley v. Baxendale, 51 Stan L Rev 1547, 1581
(1999) (concluding that "it may be harder than once believed to determine" whether conditions exist
such that a penalty default rule is appropriate). Additionally, courts and legislatures must take care to
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In contrast with shareholder choice proposals, existing private ar-
rangements leave the board in control of tender offers and employ vari-
ous mechanisms designed to reduce the board's agency costs when de-
fending against takeovers. A growing number of firms require a majority
of outsiders on the board. In addition, many firms now employ executive
stock options with early vesting on "change of control" to provide man-
agers with an incentive to support a takeover and negotiate for a higher
price." Indeed, executive stock options with "change of control" vesting
provisions not only lower board resistance to tender offers, but may en-
courage boards to support tender offers.
Kahan and Rock's analysis thus suggests that the prevalence of
"adaptive devices" indicates that corporate constituents are capable of
redressing problems associated with the board's conflict of interest in re-
sponding to tender offers. This suggests it may not be necessary to reform
existing Delaware law. Moreover, even if reform were warranted, their
analysis of the regimes actually adopted by corporate constituents im-
plies that it would not necessarily be optimal to adopt any of the pro-
posed "shareholder choice" regimes.
III. ROLE OF LAW IN REDRESSING INCOMPLETE CONTRACTS
Kahan and Rock's insight that corporate constituents can-and
do-act to redress agency cost problems and have a greater variety of
mechanisms available to them than do the courts is an important contri-
bution to the literature. This alters the nature of arguments for legal in-
tervention to considerations of the relative merits of legal versus private
action. Nevertheless, Kahan and Rock's analysis does not necessarily
support the ultimate policy conclusions they reach. In particular, the
availability of private arrangements does not necessarily reduce the im-
portance of legal intervention or imply that the development of "just say
no" was any less damaging than previously believed. Nor does the cur-
avoid enacting suboptimal default rules if lawyers and corporate constituents exhibit status quo bias
and thus do not contract around default rules even when it would be in their best interests to do so.
See, for example, Russell Korobkin, The Status Quo Bias and Contract Default Rules, 83 Cornell L
Rev 608, 675 (1998) (arguing that parties might "fail to contract around inefficient defaults when
their preference for maintaining the status quo relative to alternative states swamps their preference
for the alternative contract term relative to the default term").
30 Executive stock options with long vesting periods and "change of control provisions" pro-
vide managers with an incentive to both favor tender offers and to negotiate a higher price, notwith-
standing potential future job loss.Thus, such provisions potentially reduce the board's conflict of in-
terests in responding to tender offers while enabling the shareholders to potentially benefit from the
board's informational advantage in assessing tender offers. Id at 15-17,40. For a discussion of the in-
centives these options can provide to the board see Kamar, Managerial Change-in-Control Benefits
and Takeovers at 4-6 (cited in note 18) (emphasizing the importance of early vesting provisions).
31 For an excellent discussion of the impact of executive stock options on a board's incentives
to accept a tender offer bid, see Kamar, Managerial Change-in-Control Benefits and Takeovers (cited
in note 18).
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rent pattern of corporate agreements necessarily suggest that "share-
holder choice" is a suboptimal rule.
The fact that parties voluntarily adopt mechanisms to address take-
over-defense agency costs does not necessarily suggest that there is little
role for law. Indeed, the economics literature on incomplete contracts re-
veals that legal intervention may be a requisite for optimal contracting
because, absent optimal legal intervention, contracting parties may vol-
untarily adopt suboptimal agreements. Courts and parties may both have
a role to play in reducing problems associated with incomplete contracts
because each may be able to respond to agency cost problems in differ-
ent ways. Just as parties can employ mechanisms not available to courts,
courts can use mechanisms not available to the parties. Thus legal inter-
vention is not necessarily a substitute for private contracting, but rather
may increase the parties' ability to write optimal private agreements.
Moreover, the agreements parties reach in the presence of optimal legal
intervention may differ significantly from those they would adopt in the
absence of such intervention. Existing arrangements may be an appro-
priate response to the prevailing legal regime, but they may not be opti-
mal if the legal regime itself is suboptimal.
This Part examines the potential role for law in limiting a particular
problem associated with designing "adaptive devices" to address tender
offer defenses-that of unforeseen contingencies associated with take-
over defenses. It shows that Delaware's adoption of "just say no" may
have affected the nature of the adaptive devices available to corporate
constituents. This could have reduced shareholder welfare notwithstand-
ing widespread use of bilateral adaptive devices.
A. Incomplete Contracts and Unforeseen Contingencies
Corporate law scholarship has focused primarily on one of the many
types of impediments to contracting: "contracting costs." Concern for
contracting costs as the central impediment to private agreements leads
to two conclusions: (1) legal rules should focus on solving the substantive
problems facing parties by providing optimal default rules; and (2) legal
rules need not intervene when parties appear to be redressing agency
cost problems themselves. This standard view of contractual incomplete-
ness naturally leads to Kahan and Rock's conclusion that court interven-
tion is not needed if parties are solving problems themselves through
private bilateral agreements.
Yet "costly contracting" is not the only barrier to optimal corporate
contracting; other contracting problems exist.32 Of particular importance
32 Although the present analysis focuses on unforeseen contingencies, other problems exist
that may warrant legal intervention. See, for example, W. Bentley MacLeod, Complexity and Con-
tract, working paper (Apr 2001), available online at <http://hal-law.usc.edu/cleo/conferences/
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in the tender offer context, private action is plagued by problems arising
from unforeseen contingencies. 3 Boundedly rational parties cannot pre-
dict, and thus cannot contract over, all future possibilities. This impedes
optimal contracting. One obvious effect of unforeseen contingencies is
that the parties' contract will be incomplete: it will not specify the de-
sired payoffs should the unforeseen event occur. This possibility forms
the cornerstone of much of the contracts literature on optimal default
rules."
Evidence that a contingency (such as the poison pill) is foreseen and
that corporate constituents are contracting-or adopting adaptive de-
vices-might seem to suggest that unforeseen contingencies are not an
issue. This is not the case. Unforeseen contingencies may cause parties to
leave contracts vague or unspecified even with respect to contingencies
they can predict.
Consider two parties writing a contract to govern a situation where
each can take actions that affect the welfare of the other. Assume that
the range of actions available to one party is foreseeable and easily sub-
ject to contracting, yet the range of options available to the other is not
entirely foreseeable. Although the parties could write a contract specify-
ing the obligations of the first party, they may fail to do so given their in-
ability to fully constrain the actions available to the second party, or they
may write a much less restrictive term than they otherwise would. Thus,
in the presence of unforeseen contingencies available to the second
party, the parties may leave the contract intentionally more vague than
necessary in order to grant the first party the ability to respond to strate-
gic behavior by the second.3
be2001/macleod.pdf> (visited Apr 19,2002); George J.Mailath and Andrew PostlewaiteAsymmetric
Information Bargaining Problems with ManyAgents,57 Rev Econ Stud 351,352 (1990) (noting that
it becomes difficult to fashion rules for cost-sharing when individual valuations are not known).
33 Nonverifiability is an additional problem. For example, shareholders cannot write a contract
precluding "antitakeover devices" because it is difficult to verify that a particular corporate action is
an antitakeover device. For example, a merger that increases a firm's debt/equity ratio considerably
may be pursued for legitimate business reasons or may be motivated largely to deter tender offers.
34 See, for example, Oliver Hart and John Moore, Incomplete Contracts and Renegotiation, 56
Econometrica 755,757 (1988) (noting that boundedly rational parties "may be unable to anticipate
every eventuality, and may find it too difficult to decide (and reach agreement about) how to deal
with eventualities which they do foresee"). See also HerbertA. Simon, The Sciences of theArtificial
37-38 (MIT 2d ed 1981) (arguing that boundedly rational parties may not specify certain contingen-
cies or recognize the need to specify some dimension of contractual performance). Unforeseen con-
tingencies do not necessarily justify legal intervention. Under certain circumstances (not present
here), parties may be able to redress the problem themselves. See Eric Maskin and Jean Tirole, Un-
foreseen Contingencies and Incomplete Contracts, 66 Rev Econ Stud 83, 84 (1999) (arguing that if
parties have trouble foreseeing the possible physical contingencies, they can write contracts that ex
ante specify only the possible payoff contingencies and that when the state of the world is realized,
they can fill in the details).
35 See B. Douglas Bernheim and Michael D.Whinston,Incomplete Contracts and StrategicAm-
biguity, 88 Am Econ Rev 902,903 (1998) (describing such incompleteness as "strategic ambiguity").
Professors Bernheim and Whinston give the following example of the use of strategic ambiguity to
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B. Unforeseen Contingencies and Takeovers
Contracting over tender offer defenses is plagued by considerations
of unforeseen contingencies. For example, although shareholders and
managers can foresee the possibility of a takeover and the possibility
that the board will want to defend against it, they cannot predict the
structure of all possible board defensive measures. Recognition of the
importance of unforeseen contingencies affects both claims about the
role of law when parties can adopt adaptive devices and the implications
about optimal law that can be drawn from the structure of existing de-
vices.
Given the great variety of defensive measures available to the
board, shareholders may be reluctant to limit board power to adopt par-
ticular defensive measures -such as poison pills and classified boards -
for fear that boards would respond by adopting measures that are even
more destructive. Accordingly, in the current legal climate the prevalence
of classified boards does not necessarily imply that shareholders support
effective classified boards -only that they prefer them to the range of
"scorched earth" defenses that boards might employ otherwise.
Nor can shareholders necessarily eliminate the problem of boards'
defensive measures through adoption of rules requiring shareholder
choice in the event of a tender offer. Absent court oversight, boards
would retain the power to frustrate shareholder choice rules through de-
fensive measures undertaken ex ante, prior to announcement of a bid
(such as restructuring the firm).3 Thus, shareholder choice may not be
optimal in the current legal regime of relatively low court oversight of
defensive measures.
Thus, the fact that in the current climate shareholders appear to ac-
cept board power to fend off takeovers-employing executive stock op-
respond to unforeseen contingencies. Consider the contracting problem between a faculty member
and a university.This contract involves the possibility of strategic behavior on each side.The tenured
faculty member may fail to be optimally productive. The university, in turn, can fail to provide the
faculty member with the resources she needs to do her scholarship: for example, adequate future sal-
ary, resources for research, travel and conferences, adequate office space, secretarial support, and
teaching schedule. The university's future obligations to the faculty member are relatively easy to
identify ex ante, and can be readily specified in a contract. By contrast, the faculty member's obliga-
tions are more difficult to specify by contract (assuming the university cares about quality, as well as
quantity, of scholarly output).The important insight of Bernheim and Whinston's analysis is that the
parties' inability to contract over the professor's obligation to the university may lead them to also
leave the university's obligations to the professor unspecified, even though delineating the latter
would not be difficult. Leaving the university's obligations to the professor unspecified, by contrast,
creates a relational contract which enables the university to provide the professor with incentives to
give the desired level of performance. See id at 903-04.
36 See, for example, Hilton Hotels Corp v ITT Corp, 978 FSupp 1342,1344 (D Nev 1997) (stat-
ing that a target board sought to institute a comprehensive plan whereby it would break itself into
three separate corporations and prevent a bidder from acquiring the board positions on board of the
largest of the three).
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tions geared to promote takeovers-does not imply such arrangements
are optimal. Indeed, while existing executive stock options are a reason-
able response to the current regime, reasons exist to suspect that this
structure is not necessarily first-best optimal. As Professor Kamar has
shown, executive stock options with "change of control" provisions may
give boards excessive incentives to sell the company.3 Moreover, these
provisions do nothing to ensure that shareholders receive the optimal
amount of any gains resulting from an acquisition. Boards in control of
acquisitions can reap a disproportionate share of the gains.38Thus evi-
dence that acquisitions continue in the wake of Delaware's "just say no"
defense does not imply either that the acquisitions that occur are optimal
or that acquisitions are structured optimally.
C. Legal Intervention to Redress Unforeseen Contingencies
Unforeseen contingencies may justify legal intervention even when
private action is possible. Courts can reduce the distorting effects of un-
foreseen contingencies through the use of mechanisms not practicably
available to the parties-such as legal standards. For example, a court can
provide a form of insurance against unforeseen contingencies by pre-
committing to intervene on specified terms in the event of an unforeseen
contingency. A central advantage of court action is that a court need not
identify in advance the precise nature of the unforeseen contingency that
will result in intervention. Rather, a court can employ a legal standard
under which it commits to intervene should certain contingencies arise,
with the nature of the intervention depending on the parties' ex post
payoffs. Such a legal rule not only may reduce the cost of the occurrence
of an unforeseen contingency itselft but also may increase the parties'
joint welfare by reducing the risk to the parties of unforeseen contingen-
cies. This can enable the parties to write better terms to govern those fu-
ture actions they can foresee. Thus court intervention may be needed to
enable the parties to write optimal agreements.39  C
37 Kamar, Managerial Change-in-Control Benefits and Takeovers at 4-6,12-17 (cited in note
18) (noting that changes in control result in accelerated vesting of stock options and leads to greater
incentives for sale).
38 See id at 6-23 (stating that the practice of sweetening existing executive compensation ar-
rangements while deal negotiations are taking place is common).
39 See Luca Anderlini, Leonardo Felli and Andrew Postlewaite, Courts of Law and Unforeseen
Contingencies at 5, Pennsylvania Institute of Economic Research Working Paper No 01-010 (March
2001), available online at <http'/www.econ.upenn.edu/Centers/pier/Archive/01-010.pdf> (visited Feb
19,2002) (creating a model of court intervention where the court determines whether to intervene by
"trading off parties' incentive to invest with their desire for insurance in the event of unforeseen con-
tingencies"). See also Maskin and Trole, 66 Rev Econ Stud at 99-100 (cited in note 34) (noting that
when courts have substantial discretionary authority, existence of unforeseen contingencies does not
necessarily adversely affect payoff outcomes achievable through contracting).
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As applied to takeover defenses, this analysis presents the possibility
that shareholders' and managers' joint welfare may well have been
higher under Delaware's earlier takeover doctrine-which threatened to
invalidate "disproportionate" takeover defenses-than it is presently un-
der the current permissive approach towards boards' tender offer de-
fenses.'4 "Just say no" removed the court from its previous role of limiting
the range of strategic actions available to the board. If this legal change
left shareholders more vulnerable to board defensive measures, then the
change in law could well have both hurt shareholders and altered the ac-
ceptable range of adaptive devices. Thus the Delaware court's adoption
of "just say no" may have had serious adverse consequences for share-
holder welfare even though corporations adopted measures to reduce its
adverse effect. Under a different regime with serious scrutiny of anti-
takeover measures, shareholders would likely adopt alternative adaptive
devices. Indeed, should the Delaware Court ever adopt effective over-
sight of coercive bids and defensive measures (whether taken ex ante or
ex post), shareholders might support "shareholder choice" rules.
CONCLUSION
Much of the literature on takeovers has focused on designing opti-
mal default rules to govern takeover defenses. Such legal interventions
typically are justified on the grounds that transactions costs may prohibit
the parties from adopting optimal agreements themselves. This literature
generally focuses on contracting costs as a primary source of contracting
problems.
Kahan and Rock's Article makes a valuable contribution to this lit-
erature by revealing that private parties can, and do, devise solutions to
address boards' agency costs in responding to tender offers. Indeed, par-
ties have a greater range of options available to them than do the courts.
Moreover, Kahan and Rock note that existing corporate agreements do
not correspond to the strong "shareholder choice" rules proposed by
corporate scholars.
40 Indeed, shareholder welfare might have been further improved had the Delaware court en-
hanced its Unocal standard by precluding boards from adopting excessive (in other words, value-
reducing) tender offer defenses. Such a standard is reminiscent of the Delaware Court's original ar-
ticulation of the Unocal standard, with one critical distinction: under this standard the court would
determine itself whether the defensive measure is excessive, and would not simply accept an in-
formed board's assertion that the measure is in the firm's best interests. Adoption of such a legal
standard potentially could reduce the risk to shareholders of unforeseen board action, giving share-
holders greater ability to regulate those measures they can foresee (such as classified boards).This is
not to say that such a legal standard is necessarily optimal. Articulating an optimal legal rule to gov-
ern tender offer defenses is beyond the scope of this comment. The central purpose of considering
such a rule is simply to illustrate that the interaction between the legal regime and the types of pri-
vate agreements parties reach.
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This analysis is important for a number of reasons. First, it suggests
that contracting costs cannot be assumed to preclude corporate constitu-
ents from designing solutions to the problem of tender offer defenses
given evidence that such adaptive devices exist. Second, Kahan and
Rock's analysis presents a challenge to scholars seeking to develop opti-
mal mechanisms to regulate takeovers: revealing that such efforts must
include consideration of the range of instruments available to the parties,
in addition to those available to the courts. Finally, Kahan and Rock's
evidence about the existing structure of corporate agreements raises the
question of whether shareholder choice rules are optimal, given the lack
of existing shareholder support for such proposals.
Nevertheless, the presence of private adaptive devices cannot be
taken as evidence that the law governing takeovers is any less important
than previously believed. Recognition of the courts' special ability to re-
spond to certain unforeseen contingencies reveals that legal intervention
may be important even when private contracting is possible. Specifically,
the change from Unocal to "just say no" replaced the previous legal stan-
dard limiting the threat posed by takeover defenses with a regime that
depends more on corporate contracting.This could have substantially re-
duced shareholder welfare if court oversight provided shareholders with
important protections unavailable through private assignments.Thus, the
fact that the corporate constituents can plausibly "contract" does not re-
solve the important issue of whether court oversight is significantly wel-
fare enhancing.
Nor, for related reasons, do existing adaptive devices provide strong
evidence concerning the optimal approach to takeover defenses. Were
the existing legal regime an optimal legal regime, then the prevailing ex-
isting private arrangements could plausibly be presumptively optimal de-
fault provisions. Yet this conclusion does not necessarily hold if the exist-
ing legal regime is not optimal. This is particularly true where, as here,
private contracting is distorted by unforeseen contingencies-such as the
great variety of possible defensive measures available to the board. Un-
able to identify all such contingencies, shareholders may prefer to let
boards employ defensive measures such as the poison pill or classified
board because precluding such measures would result in boards using
other, potentially more damaging measures without threat of legal sanc-
tion. Under a different legal regime, however, shareholders might well
support very different arrangements.
Finally, and more generally, examination of the interaction of con-
tracting problems and legal regimes reveals the importance of distin-
guishing between the different types of contracting costs, and carefully
calibrating any legal intervention to respond to the particular type of
contracting problem at issue. Whereas "contracting costs" may be rea-
sonably addressed by mechanisms that replicate the agreements the par-
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ties would reach were contracting costless, concern with unforeseen con-
tingencies requires lawmakers to consider mechanisms not available to
the parties. Thus additional consideration should be given to both the
precise nature of the contracting problems affecting the corporate par-
ties and the differences between the mechanisms available to courts and
private parties to redress such problems.
